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A corporation is an artificial person created for an economic purpose, as described in 
various aspects of the Theory of the Firm.  Recent historical and comparative research 
shows that corporations in most countries come in groups, each controlled by a single 
principal. This has implications for various “theories of the firm”.   The perception that 
firms ought to be run to maximize shareholder value, though commonplace in financial 





Randall Morck is Stephen A. Jarislowsky distinguished Professor of Finance at the 
University of Alberta,  Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
and  William Lyon  Mackenzie King Visiting Professor at the Harvard Economics 
Department.   
 
This is a working paper version of an article prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary of 




A corporation is an artificial person, with  many of the legal rights of a biological one.  
This modern legal and economic usage arose in the 16
th century from the term’s now 
archaic meaning of ‘a group acting as one body’ – encompassing municipal governments, 
businesses, and other groups of  individuals united  towards a common  goal.  In that 
century and the next, trade with the Orient and New World promised immense returns, 
but only after vast capital outlays for fleets of ships, networks of forts, and private armies 
to defend them. The first business corporations, such as the Dutch East Indies Company, 
the British East India Company, and the Hudson’s Bay Company, were formed to pool 
the savings of many individuals  and permit ventures on a scale none could afford 
individually.  Each owner of a share of the corporation was periodically entitled to a 
dividend – a pro rata division of the corporation’s free cash flow.   
  Polling all a corporation’s shareholders for each business decision was impractical 
in an age of sailing ships and horse-drawn carriages.  Instead, the shareholders elected 
boards of governors (later  directors)  – reputable men  trusted by the majority of 
shareholders to direct the corporation’s affairs.   
  This did not prevent all dispute.  The Dutch East Indies Company (Vereenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie in Dutch) was formed as a limited time venture.  When that 
limit drew near, the board  boldly  announced that the corporation would  persist 
indefinitely.  T he shareholders sued to force a liquidating dividend  – and lost!  
Fortunately, they found they could sell their shares to other investors for the value of a 
liquidating dividend – or even more (Frentrop, 2002/3).  Thus was born the first modern 
stock market, and the  alienability, or unhindered sale, of shares became  a defining 
characteristic of a corporation.  Letting shareholders realize their investments by selling 
their shares, rather than liquidating the business, gave corporations a second defining 
characteristic:  indefinitely long lives.   
  Boards occasionally betrayed their shareholders’ trust and caused a corporation to 
contravene the law. Since individual shareholders were not consulted, holding them fully 
to account for the corporation’s misdeeds seemed wrong.  Since the corporation is a legal 
person, plaintiffs  could sue it  directly,  and need not sue its shareholders personally.  
Thus,  limited liability  statutes  came to shield individual shareholders from personal 
lawsuits for wrongs by corporations whose shares they own.  Limited liability, a third 
defining characteristic of  the modern business corporation,  is an important innovation 
because it frees individuals to invest their savings in corporations run by strangers, 
undertaking risky ventures, or doing business in far off places.  Vulnerability to personal 
lawsuits would otherwise make such investments seem  indefensibly reckless to most 
savers.   
  Early corporations, like the Hudson’s Bay Company, assigned one vote to each 
share in board elections.  This essentially let the wealthiest shareholders appoint the 
board and, if they wished, run the corporation in their narrow interest, rather than in the 
interests of all shareholders equally.  For example, a large shareholder might force the 
corporation to do business with another corporation she controlled on disadvantageous 
terms.  This sort of self-dealing, which Johnson et al. (2000) dub tunneling, remains a 
widespread corporate governance concern  where firms  typically have dominant   2 
shareholders.  Or a dominant shareholder might simply relish the  perks,  power, and 
prestige of running the corporation, and refuse to make way for more qualified managers 
– a corporate governance problem called entrenchment (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1988).  Entrenchment and tunneling  provide controlling shareholders with  private 
benefits of control – returns not shared with small shareholders (Dyck and Zingales, 
2004).  Distorted corporate governance associated with private benefits of control 
remains a  first order  governance  concern  wherever corporations typically have 
controlling shareholder.  According to  La Porta et al. (1999), this includes  the large 
corporate sectors of virtually all countries except Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.    Small and middle sized corporations everywhere tend to have 
controlling shareholders.   
  In the 19
th century, democratic corporate governance became associated with one 
vote per shareholder, rather than one vote per share (Dunlavy, 2004).  Echoes of this 
remain in the voting caps of modern Canadian and European corporations, which limit 
any single shareholder’s voting power regardless of shares owned.  However, large 
shareholders in many countries later turned deviations from one vote per share to their 
advantage by granting themselves special classes of common stock with many votes per 
share.  In  most countries, such dual class shares now virtually always magnify, rather 
than limit, the voting power of large shareholders, and so amplify, rather than dampen, 
problems associated with private benefits of control (Nenova, 2003).   
  In the United States and the United Kingdom, however, one vote per share is the 
norm in shareholder meetings.  Disclosure rules, regulatory oversight, officer and director 
liability, and other restraints on private benefits of control also seem more effective in 
America and Britain than elsewhere in curtailing private benefits of control (LaPorta et 
al, 1999; Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  This makes being a large shareholder less attractive, 
especially if holding a diversified portfolio of small stakes in many firms reduces risk 
(Burkart et al., 2003).  Unsurprisingly, most large American and British corporations now 
lack controlling shareholders ( LaPorta et al., 1999).  They are run by professional 
managers who often own few shares (Morck et al., 1988).   
  A small shareholder who monitored and controlled these corporate top managers 
would bear all the investigative, legal, and administrative costs involved, but the benefits 
of better governance would be spread across all shareholders. The cost therefore typically 
exceeds the benefit for any small shareholder acting alone (Grossman and Hart, 1988).  
The consequent  general  lack of monitoring and control in corporations with no large 
shareholder gives rise to other people’s money corporate governance problems.  Adam 
Smith (1776) famously explains that since corporate managers who own few or no shares 
are more “ the managers of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be 
expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a 
rich man, they ... consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour and 
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it.”   Unmonitored professional 
managers can thus enjoy the perks and privileges of running large corporations without 
any real concern for the returns they generate.  Berle and Means (1932) argue that this 
sort of governance problem occurs in many large American corporations.   
  But in other countries, other people’s money governance problems probably also 
afflict many corporations that, on first inspection, seem to have a controlling shareholder.    3 
This is because large corporations  in most countries are not freestanding entities, but 
belong to  corporate groups (LaPorta et al., 1999).  These are typically pyramidal 
structures, in which an apex shareholder, usually an extremely wealthy family, controls 
one or more listed corporations, which each control more listed corporations, which each 
control yet more listed corporations, ad valorem et infinitum.  A family that controls 51% 
of a listed corporation that controls 51% of another that controls 51% of yet another and 
so on actually owns only 0.51
n  of the corporation n tiers down the in pyramid, with the 
remained of each corporation financed by public or minority shareholders. Pyramids with 
a dozen or more layers are not uncommon, rendering the controlling shareholder’s actual 
ownership of corporations at the pyramid’s base negligible.  Pyramidal business groups 
thus permit controlling shareholders to extract private benefits of control from corporate 
empires financed largely from other people’s money. (Morck et al., 2000; Bebchuk et al., 
2000) Pyramids were common in the United States until the 1930s (Berle and Means, 
1932; Bonbright and Means, 1934), but were eliminated by various New Deal initiatives, 
including the double and multiple taxation of inter-corporate dividends (Morck, 2005).  
British pyramids apparently withered under sustained attacks from institutional investors 
(Franks et al., 2005).  However, the relevant unit of economic analysis for many purposes 
elsewhere in the world should often be the business group, not the corporation.    
  Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that agency costs, the present value of the costs 
of expected future governance shortfalls of any sort, are born by the corporation’s initial 
shareholders.   A corporation’s founders receive less per share when they first sell shares 
to outside investors if worse corporate governance problems seem likely.    
This gives rise to a time inconsistency problem in securities and corporations law.  
Investors and entrepreneurs selling shares to the public benefit from credible guarantees 
of good governance because these limit agency costs and so raise share prices.   But top 
corporate decision makers in firms that already issued shares, who foresee issuing no 
more, wish to maximize their utility (Baumol, 1959, 1962; and Williamson, 1964) and 
understandably value the freedom to spend public shareholders’ money as they like and 
to capture such private benefits of control as they can.  Actual public policy probably 
reflects these groups’  relative political lobbying power, which can change over time 
(Morck et al., 2000; Morck et al., 2005).   
  The normative view that a corporation  should be run to maximize shareholder 
value derives from economists’ assumption that firms maximize profits.  In neoclassical 
economic theory, a  firm that maximizes the present value of  all its expected  future 
economic profits necessarily maximizes the market value of its shares.  This follows from 
modeling the corporation as a nexus of contracts, with the shareholders the residual 
claimants to the firm’s cash flows (Fama and Jensen, 1983, 1983a).  Neoclassical theory 
further allows that profit maximization (value maximization  in a multi-period setting) 
accords with economic  efficiency under certain idealized conditions; see e.g.  Varian 
(1992), Malliaris and Brock (1983).   
This normative view conflicts with  the actual legal duties of corporate officers, 
directors, and controlling shareholders in many countries.  For example, many northern 
European countries and some US states impose a duty to balance shareholders’ interests 
with those of stakeholders, especially employees.  This is formalized in the German legal 
principle of  Mitbestimmung (co-determination), which requires members of the 
Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board) of a large corporation to balance the interests of   4 
shareholders, employees, and the State ( Fohlin, 2005).  Common Law legal systems 
assign officers and directors a duty to act for the corporation. In Britain and the United 
States, this is often interpreted as a duty to act for the corporation’s owners, its 
shareholders.  A duty to maximize share value seems implicit (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Black and Coffee, 1997).  However, the Canadian Supreme Court holds in Peoples 
v. Wise that the duty of the officers and directors of a corporation is not to shareholders, 
nor to any other stakeholders, but to the corporation  per se. The social welfare 
implications of assigning different legal duties to corporate top  decision makers  are 
incompletely understood.  Giving labor a voice in corporate decision making seems to 
impede risk taking and hamper growth (Falaye et al. 2005).  Moreover, regardless of their 
assigned objective, if those entrusted to govern great corporations occasionally put their 
own interests ahead of their legal duties, agency costs must arise in some form.     
The view that a corporation’s top managers ought to maximize shareholder value 
also  collides with evidence that stock prices are sometimes set by investors with 
incomplete information (Myers and Majluf, 1984) or behavioral biases (Shleifer, 2000).  
Coase (1937) argues that firms come about to alleviate information asymmetries and 
other market imperfections,  collectively  denoted  transactions costs,  and that  the 
boundaries of the firm correspond to an efficient solution to these problems.  Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) argue that the critical market imperfections arise from people working in 
teams.  Williamson (1975) argues that interdependent assets are more generally 
important.  Jensen (2004) calls for more research on normative theories about  the 
boundaries of the corporation and the objective function of  its top decision makers if 
stock prices are set by noise traders, that is,  investors with behavioral biases.  One 
approach holds that corporations actually exist primarily to lock the economy’s capital 
into productive uses by isolating capital allocation decisions from maniac or panicked 
investors (Stout, 2004). This view long dominated discussions of corporate management 
in Japan (e.g. Aoki and Dore, 1994) but appears to give rise to its own set of 
inefficiencies (see e.g. Morck and Nakamura, 1999).   
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